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dsh-plugin-vajraclaw

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dsh-plugin-vajraclaw ยท v2.1.0 ยท Apache-2.0

Local tool-call failsafe for DSH: blocks a fixed list of high-risk shell patterns and credential-file reads before execution, with a per-session hash-linked JSONL audit log, and an optional external Gateway for centralized policy.

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dsh plugin add dsh-plugin-vajraclaw

Confirm the layer applied with dsh --profile default --dump-config โ€” see the install guide.

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โšก DROSโ„ข VajraClaw for DSH & Multi-Agent Workstations

Local Tool-Call Failsafe & Runtime Governance Sidecar for Autonomous AI Agents

Official Website DSH Compatible npm version Patent Status

English | ็น้ซ”ไธญๆ–‡่ชชๆ˜Ž | ๐ŸŒ Official Website

Local tool-call failsafe for DSH: blocks high-risk shell patterns (e.g. destructive recursive deletions, fork bombs, disk overwriting) and credential-file reads before execution, with a persistent hash-linked JSONL audit log, and an optional external Gateway for centralized multi-agent policy.

๐ŸŽฏ Dual Architecture Overview:

  1. Embedded Mode (Default): Zero-dependency local TypeScript pattern-matching failsafe and JSONL audit chain running natively inside DSH with zero latency overhead.
  2. Gateway Mode (Optional): Connect to an external DROS Gateway container for multi-agent workstation synchronization (AGY, Codex, Claude Code, Cursor).
                 DSH Tool Call Event
                          โ”‚
                          โ–ผ
            [dsh-plugin-vajraclaw]
                          โ”‚
           โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ดโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
           โ–ผ                             โ–ผ
   [Embedded Mode] (Default)      [Gateway Mode] (Optional)
   โ€ข Regex Pattern Failsafe       โ€ข Centralized Multi-Agent Policy
   โ€ข Sensitive File Protection    โ€ข Cross-Station Sync (AGY, Codex, Claude)
   โ€ข Persistent JSONL Audit       โ€ข Requires DROS Gateway Container

๐ŸŽ ใ€Community Edition: Free Forever for Personal Multi-Agent Workstationsใ€‘

  • ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ 100% Free for Personal Use (Non-Commercial Use): Embedded local failsafe is fully open-source (Apache-2.0).
  • ๐Ÿ“ Audit Logging: Structured JSONL audit records linking execution history across session restarts.
  • โšก Optional Centralized Gateway: Provides cross-agent governance when opting into external Gateway deployment.

๐Ÿ“Œ Compliance Notice: Any deployment operated by corporate entities, salaried employees within the scope of employment, or used to generate commercial value strictly requires a commercial license.


๐Ÿ›๏ธ Philosophy: Guarding the Hyper-Open Plugin Ecosystem

The brilliance of DeepSeek Harness (DSH) lies in its radical openness: "Everything is a plugin." However, this hyper-openness inevitably expands the attack surface:

  • Any rogue third-party plugin can attempt unauthorized tool execution, memory poisoning, or silent data exfiltration.
  • DROS steps in as the universal anchor, orchestrating best-of-breed open-source security tools (Falco eBPF, Cilium CNI, Wazuh SIEM) to construct an impregnable Defense-in-Depth perimeter for all developers!
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ 1. In-App Layer: DSH Security Plugins                       โ”‚  <โ”€โ”€ ๐Ÿข Reception Security (Prompt Filtering)
โ”‚    (NeMo / Llama-Guard filters conversational toxicity)     โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ฌโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
                               โ”‚ (Valid Prompt, prepares Tool Call)
                               โ–ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ 2. Runtime Gateway: DROS VajraClaw (Core Anchor)            โ”‚  <โ”€โ”€ ๐Ÿ›๏ธ Vault Gatekeeper (Execution Identity)
โ”‚    (W3C DID Signature + 364ns O(1) Tool Permission Bitmap)  โ”‚      Enforcement-path latency <1 ฮผs under specified benchmark!
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ฌโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
                               โ”‚ (Permitted Tool Call)
                               โ–ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ 3. Infrastructure Layer: Open-Source SecOps (Cilium / Falco)โ”‚  <โ”€โ”€ ๐Ÿš“ Police Grid (Kernel & Network Fabric)
โ”‚    (Cilium blocks rogue egress; Falco eBPF catches escapes)  โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜

๐Ÿงญ Governance Scope: What DROS Defends vs. What It Doesn't

To maintain complete architectural clarity and rigorous technical defense, DROS defines crisp defensive boundaries:

Attack Vector / Threat Traditional Semantic Guardrails DROS VajraClaw Core Defensive Outcome
Indirect Prompt Injection (PDF/Web hijacking tool execution) โŒ Easily fooled by LLM confusion โœ… Deterministic Block Deterministic In-Band Fusing (<1ฮผs benchmarked bitmap match)
Rogue Tool Calling (Unauthorized DB write / Shell execution) โŒ Flawed application logic โœ… Cryptographic Block 100% Interception within defined threat model & capability vector
Data Exfiltration (Plugin silently sending tokens to C2) โŒ Invisible to LLMs โœ… Network Isolated 100% Dropped (internal: true sandbox topology)
Container Escape / Privilege Escalation โŒ No host visibility โš ๏ธ Handled via Falco eBPF Kernel Detection (cap_drop: ALL capability isolation)
Business Logic Flaws / Model Hallucinations โŒ Beyond security scope โŒ Beyond security scope Handled via Prompt engineering & Agent QA workflows

๐Ÿ”‘ Zero-Trust Key Management & Root Recovery Principle

DROS operates on a strict Zero-Trust Cryptographic Model:

  1. No Backdoors Policy: The vendor holds NO master keys. Your Ed25519 private seed hex is generated locally. Always backup your seed hex into your password manager.
  2. Rebuilding Root of Trust: If you lose your private key, recovery is only possible if you maintain Root/SSH access to the host server to re-deploy the public verification key.

๐ŸŒ Multi-Agent Workstation Architecture (DSH + AGY + Codex + Claude)

Although packaged as a DSH plugin for zero-friction setup, the underlying DROS Gateway runs in Docker (localhost:8080), enabling you to protect your entire multi-agent environment under a single 5-Agent Concurrent Governance Envelope:

graph TD
    subgraph "Your Local Developer Workstation"
        DSH[DeepSeek Harness<br/>dsh-plugin-vajraclaw] -->|HTTP / Intercept| GW[โšก DROS Docker Gateway<br/>localhost:8080]
        AGY[Google Antigravity AGY<br/>MCP / Python SDK] -->|MCP Gateway| GW
        Codex[OpenAI Codex / Claude Code<br/>Tool Interception] -->|REST / C-ABI| GW
        Cursor[Cursor / IDE Agents<br/>Local Hook] -->|API Proxy| GW
        
        GW --> Micro[๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ DROS Micro-Kernel<br/>O 1 Bitmap Matrix & Ed25519 W3C DID]
        Micro --> OS[Local OS / Filesystem / Terminal Execution]
    end

๐Ÿ“Š Dual Mode Comparison Matrix (Standalone Plugin vs. Docker Gateway)

Capability Dimension ๐Ÿ“ฆ Mode A: Standalone Plugin (Default) โšก Mode B: DROS Docker Gateway (Optional)
Runtime Environment Pure In-Process TypeScript (Zero Dependency) Local Docker Container (localhost:8080)
Supported Agents DeepSeek Harness (DSH) Only DSH + Google AGY + Codex + Claude + Cursor
Principal Identity Process-Bound Agent ID Native W3C did:key (Ed25519) Cryptographic Identity
Tool Execution Gate Robust Regex Shell & File Pattern Failsafe Deterministic AST Bitmap Policy Engine (<1ฮผs)
Audit Verification Persistent Hash-Linked JSONL (Local Disk) Ed25519 Cryptographically Signed Merkle Chain
RFC-010 Agent Passport Standard Format Interpretation Full Local Passport Issuance & Multi-Agent Attestation
Network Overhead 0 ms (Direct In-Memory Hook) <1 ms (Local Loopback HTTP / C-ABI)
License & Access 100% Free Forever (Apache-2.0) Free for Personal Hacker Use (Community)

๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Governance & Defense Capability Matrix

Threat Vector / Capability Traditional LLM Guardrails (NeMo/Lakera) ๐Ÿ“ฆ DSH Standalone TS Plugin ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ DROS Hacker Docker Gateway ๐Ÿข Enterprise / Mesh Tier
Runtime Vehicle Cloud API / External Model In-Process JS (Zero Deps) Local Docker Container (:8080) Enterprise Cluster / K8s / C-ABI
Protected Scope Single Chat Session DSH Local Process Full Ecosystem (Claude+Codex+Cursor+DSH+AGY) Multi-Node Fleet / Private Cloud
Execution Intent Governance ๐Ÿ”ด Text-matching only ๐ŸŸข Regex Pattern Failsafe ๐ŸŸข 100% Deterministic AST Fusing (<1ยตs) ๐ŸŸข AST Bitmaps + eBPF Kernel Hooks
Destructive Command Blocking ๐Ÿ”ด Vulnerable to Injections ๐ŸŸข Sensitive Path Block ๐ŸŸข Deterministic Syscall Severing ๐ŸŸข Hardware HSM + Kernel-level Lock
Credential & Secret Protection ๐Ÿ”ด No Physical Guard ๐ŸŸข Sensitive Path Block ๐ŸŸข Dynamic Redaction + Sandbox Isolation ๐ŸŸข Hardware HSM + ZKP-Lite Proofs
Agent Identity Binding ๐Ÿ”ด No Identity ๐ŸŸข Session-level ID ๐ŸŸข Native W3C did:key (Ed25519) ๐ŸŸข 3-Tier PKI DrosIdentityToken (DIT)
Non-Repudiable Audit Chain ๐Ÿ”ด Plain Text Logs ๐ŸŸข Local SHA-256 Hash Chain ๐ŸŸข Ed25519 Signed Merkle Hash Chain ๐ŸŸข EU AI Act Art. 12 Court-Grade Chain
RFC-010 Passports ๐Ÿ”ด Unsupported ๐ŸŸข Format Parser ๐ŸŸข Local Minting & Cross-Agent Verification ๐ŸŸข Cross-Organization Roaming Passports
Decision Latency ๐Ÿ”ด 1,000 ~ 3,000 ms (Slow LLM) ๐ŸŸข <1 ms (Direct In-Memory Hook) ๐ŸŸข <1 ยตs (C-ABI) / <1 ms (REST Gateway) ๐ŸŸข <500 ns (Zero-Copy Memory Lookup)
License Pay-per-Token API 100% Free (Apache-2.0) Free License for Individuals Startup $2,990 / Enterprise $29,990

๐Ÿš€ Quick Start (ๆž้€ŸไธŠๆ‰‹)

Mode A: Standalone Plugin Mode (Default, Zero-Dependency, No Docker)

Directly install the plugin in DSH to immediately enable high-risk command blocking, credential file protection, and local audit logging:

dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-plugin-vajraclaw

(Runs 100% in-process with zero network overhead and zero external dependencies)


Mode B: Advanced Multi-Agent Workstation Mode (Optional Docker Gateway)

If you wish to govern multiple multi-agent runtimes (DSH + Google AGY + Codex + Claude Code + Cursor) under a single workstation with Native W3C did:key identity, RFC-010 passports, and microsecond AST policy matrix:

  1. Launch the Free DROS Docker Gateway:
    docker run -d -p 8080:8080 --name dros-gateway dros/hacker-gateway:v1.0.0
    
  2. Configure DSH Plugin Gateway Endpoint (in DSH Settings or cordis.patch.yml):
    dsh-plugin-vajraclaw:
      gatewayUrl: "http://localhost:8080"
    
  3. Connect Other External Agents (AGY / Codex / Claude Code / Cursor):
    export DROS_GATEWAY_URL="http://localhost:8080"
    export DROS_IDENTITY_SEED="0x1a2b3c4d..." # Your local Ed25519 seed hex
    

๐Ÿ‘‰ ๐Ÿ“– Read the Advanced SecOps Guide (docs/ADVANCED_SECOPS_GUIDE.md) for internal: true network isolation, Falco eBPF, and Wazuh integration templates.



๐Ÿ“ How to Configure Security Policies (Vajra.md Guide)

DROS supports two straightforward formats: Intuitive Markdown (Vajra.md) and Structured YAML (demo_policy.yaml).

1. ๐Ÿ“„ Intuitive Markdown Example (Vajra.md)

Declare allowed capabilities and hard security boundaries in plain Markdown:

# ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ DROS Agent Security Policy (Vajra.md)

## 1. Allowed Capabilities
- Allow reading workspace files (`file_read`)
- Allow standard queries (`search_web`, `query_db`)
- Allow safe terminal commands (`git status`, `npm test`, `cargo check`)

## 2. Strict Fail-Closed Boundaries
- Block all recursive deletion or wiping commands (`rm -rf`, `rmdir /s`, `format`)
- Block access to credential paths (`.env`, `id_rsa`, `secrets.json`, `.aws/credentials`)
- Restrict transaction amounts exceeding $1,000 threshold (`amount <= 1000`)

[!IMPORTANT] ๐Ÿ”’ Crucial Security Best Practice: Lock Vajra.md to Read-Only After Configuration! To prevent compromised or hallucinating AI Agents from attempting to rewrite their own security rules to escalate privileges, always set your policy file to read-only once configured:

  • Linux / macOS: chmod 444 Vajra.md
  • Windows (PowerShell): Set-ItemProperty -Path Vajra.md -Name IsReadOnly -Value $true
  • Docker Container Mount: Mount with the read-only flag -v $(pwd)/Vajra.md:/app/demo_policy.yaml:ro

(Note: DROS kernel enforces 4-Layer Invariant Defense to intercept unauthorized policy modifications in-band; combining this with OS file-level locks achieves 100% airtight physical defense!)

2. ๐Ÿค– Let AI Generate Your Policy in 1 Second! (AI Prompt Template)

You don't need to write policies from scratch! Copy the following universal prompt to ChatGPT, Claude, or Cursor:

๐Ÿ“‹ Copy this Prompt to any LLM / AI Assistant:

You are a DROS deterministic security architecture expert. Based on my Agent requirements, generate a standard DROS "Vajra.md" security policy in Markdown.

Agent Details:
- Agent Role & Scenario: [e.g., Fullstack Developer / Customer Service / Financial Automation]
- Allowed Tools & Operations: [e.g., Read/Write src/, Run tests, Query order database]
- Strict Boundaries & Denials: [e.g., Block deletion of root/workspace, Block .env access, Payment limit $500]

Follow the DROS "Default Fail-Closed" whitelist principle and structure the output into:
1. Role & Capability Scope
2. Allowed Capabilities (Whitelist)
3. Security Boundary Constraints (Thresholds & Pattern Failsafes)

3. ๐Ÿ”„ Instant Hot Reloading

Simply mount your Vajra.md when launching the Docker gateway. Policy changes take effect in <1 microsecond without container restarts:

docker run -d -p 8080:8080 --name dros-gateway \
  -v $(pwd)/Vajra.md:/app/demo_policy.yaml \
  dros/hacker-gateway:v1.0.0

๐Ÿ“œ Technical Foundations & Benchmark Sandboxes

The deterministic runtime governance, microsecond circuit-breaking, and cryptographic audit mechanisms implemented in this project are grounded in the following academic research and open-source benchmark environments:

  1. Core Architecture & Six Fundamental Boundaries:

  2. Defense-in-Depth Substrate (4-Layer Model):

  3. External C-ABI & Non-Repudiable Attribution (PGM):

  4. Open Technical Standard & Verification Benchmark:

    • RFC-010 Standard: Compliant with Open Agent Passport & Evidence Specification (W3C DID did:key & Ed25519 signature chain).
    • Benchmark Testbed: DROS-VEP Lite (Reproducible Security Sandbox)
    • Empirical Report: 24-hour continuous multi-scenario soak test report (160,611 requests verified at 26.1ฮผs decision latency).

๐Ÿ›๏ธ Official Organization & Contact Information


๐Ÿ“„ Patent & Legal Notices

Patent Notice: DROS deterministic runtime execution governance and in-band interception technology is protected under U.S. Provisional Patent Application (U.S. PPA No. 64/111,973, Patent Pending). All commercial rights reserved by Top-Celestial Company Ltd.


๐Ÿ‡น๐Ÿ‡ผ ็น้ซ”ไธญๆ–‡่ชชๆ˜Ž

้€š็”จๅž‹ AI Agent ็ขบๅฎšๆ€ง้‹่กŒๆœŸๅฎ‰ๅ…จๆฒป็†่ˆ‡ๅพฎ็ง’็ดš็†”ๆ–ทๅพฎๆ ธๅฟƒใ€‚ๅŽŸ็”Ÿ้ฉ้… DeepSeek Harness (DSH) ๅค–ๆŽ›๏ผŒๅŒๆ™‚ๅฏไฝœ็‚บ Docker ๆœฌๅœฐ Sidecar ๅฎˆ่ญท AGY (Google Antigravity)ใ€OpenAI Codexใ€Claude Codeใ€Cursor ่ˆ‡ OpenClaw ็ญ‰ๅ„้กž Agentใ€‚

๐ŸŽฏ ๆ ธๅฟƒๆžถๆง‹ๅฎšไฝ๏ผˆไธ€ๅฅ่ฉฑๆ‹†่งฃ่ช็Ÿฅ๏ผ‰๏ผš
DSH ๆ˜ฏ DROS ็š„็คพ็พคๅ…ฅๅฃ๏ผ›DROS ๆ˜ฏ่ทจ Agent ็š„ๅŸท่กŒๆฒป็†ๅฑคใ€‚

                 ๅ–ๅพ—ๅ…ฅๅฃ (GET IT HERE)
                    DSH ๅธ‚้›†ๅค–ๆŽ›
                         โ”‚
                         โ”‚ ๆธ ้“ๅˆ†็™ผ (distribution)
                         โ–ผ
                   DROS VajraClaw
                         โ”‚
                 ้ƒจ็ฝฒๅฝขๆ…‹ (DEPLOY IT HERE)
                   Docker / Sidecar
                         โ”‚
       โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ผโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
       โ–ผ                 โ–ผ                 โ–ผ
      DSH               AGY              Codex ... (Claude, Cursor, OpenClaw)
       โ”‚                 โ”‚                 โ”‚
       โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ผโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
                         โ–ผ
                DROS ๆฒป็†้‚Š็•Œ (Enforcement)
                         โ”‚
           โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ผโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
           โ–ผ             โ–ผ             โ–ผ
          MCP           API           CLI

๐ŸŽ ใ€ๅ€‹ไบบ้–‹็™ผ่€…็คพ็พค็‰ˆ๏ผšๅคš Agent ๅทฅไฝœ็ซ™ๆฐธไน…ๅ…่ฒปใ€‘

  • ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ ๅ€‹ไบบไฝฟ็”จ๏ผˆ้žๅ•†ๆฅญ็”จ้€”๏ผ‰ 100% ๆฐธไน…ๅ…่ฒป๏ผˆ็‚บๆœฌๆฉŸๅคš Agent ๅทฅไฝœ็ซ™ๅปบ็ซ‹็ตฑไธ€ๅฎ‰ๅ…จ้‚Š็•Œ๏ผŒๆ”ฏๆดๆœ€ๅคš 5 ๅ€‹ไธฆ็™ผ Agent๏ผ‰ใ€‚
  • ๐Ÿชช ไธ‰ๅฑคๅฏ†็ขผๅญธๆžถๆง‹ๆจกๅž‹ (RFC-010)๏ผš
    • ไธป้ซ”่บซๅˆ† (Identity)๏ผšๅŽŸ็”Ÿ W3C DID ้‡‘้‘ฐ็ถๅฎš (did:key:z6Mku...)ใ€‚
    • ๅŸท่กŒๅญ˜่ญ‰ (Evidence)๏ผšๆฏๆฌก Tool ๅŸท่กŒ็”ข็”Ÿ Ed25519 ๆ•ธไฝ็ฐฝ็ซ ใ€‚
    • ไธๅฏๅฆ่ช่ฟฝๆบฏ (Accountability)๏ผš้˜ฒ็ฏกๆ”นไน‹ๆœฌๆฉŸ JSON ๅฏฉ่จˆๅญ˜่ญ‰้ˆใ€‚
  • โšก Universal Docker ็ถฒ้—œ๏ผšๅŒๆ™‚ไฟ่ญท DSH ๅค–ๆŽ›ใ€MCP ๆœๅ‹™ๅ™จ่ˆ‡ๅ„้กž็ต‚็ซฏ CLI Agentใ€‚

๐Ÿ›๏ธ ๆ ธๅฟƒๅ“ฒๅญธ๏ผšๅผ•้ ˜้–‹ๆบ่ณ‡ๅฎ‰้™ฃ็‡Ÿ๏ผŒๅฎˆ่ญทๆฅต่‡ด้–‹ๆ”พ็š„ๆ’ไปถ็”Ÿๆ…‹

DeepSeek Harness (DSH) ็š„ๅ‰ๅคงไน‹่™•ๅœจๆ–ผๅ…ถๆฅต่‡ด็š„้–‹ๆ”พๆ€งโ”€โ”€ใ€Œไธ€ๅˆ‡็š†ๆ’ไปถ (Everything is a plugin)ใ€ใ€‚็„ถ่€Œ๏ผŒๆฅต่‡ด็š„้–‹ๆ”พๅฟ…็„ถไผด้šจ่‘—ๆ”ปๆ“Š้ข็š„็„ก้™ๆ”พๅคง๏ผš

  • ็ฌฌไธ‰ๆ–นๆƒกๆ„ๅค–ๆŽ›ๅฏ่ƒฝไผๅœ–่ถŠๆฌŠ่ฎ€ๆช”ใ€็ฏกๆ”นๅ…จๅŸŸ่จ˜ๆ†ถ้ซ”๏ผŒๆˆ–ๆš—ไธญๅฐ‡ๆ•ธๆ“š็™ผๅพ€ๅค–้ƒจ C2 ไผบๆœๅ™จใ€‚
  • DROS ๆ‰ฎๆผ”ไบ†ใ€Œ้–‹ๆบ่ณ‡ๅฎ‰่ˆ‡็ถฒ็ฎก็š„้ ˜้ ญ็พŠ่ˆ‡ๆ ธๅฟƒๅฎš้Œจใ€๏ผšๆ”œๆ‰‹ Falco eBPFใ€Cilium ็ถฒ่ทฏ้š”้›ข่ˆ‡ Wazuh ๅฏฉ่จˆ๏ผŒ็‚บๅ…จ็ƒ้–‹็™ผ่€…ๆžถๆง‹่ตทๅฎŒๆ•ด็š„็ซ‹้ซ”้˜ฒ็ฆฆ็ธฑๆทฑ๏ผŒ่ฎ“ๆฏไฝ Agent ็Žฉๅฎถ้ƒฝ่ƒฝๅฎ‰ๅฟƒไบซๅ—้–‹ๆบ็”Ÿๆ…‹็š„่‡ช็”ฑ๏ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ 1. ๆ‡‰็”จ็จ‹ๅผๅ…ง้ƒจๅฑค (In-App Layer: DSH ๅ…ง้ƒจๆ’ไปถ)              โ”‚  <โ”€โ”€ ๐Ÿข ๅ‰ๅฐๅฎ‰ๆชข (Prompt Filter)
โ”‚    - NeMo / Llama-Guard: ่ฒ ่ฒฌๅฐ่ฉฑ่ชžๆ„ๅฏฉๆŸฅ่ˆ‡ไธ่‰ฏๅ…งๅฎน้Žๆฟพ     โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ฌโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
                               โ”‚ (้€š้Ž่ชžๆ„ๅฏฉๆŸฅ๏ผŒAgent ็™ผ่ตท Tool Call)
                               โ–ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ 2. ้‹่กŒๆœŸๆฒป็†้–˜้“ (Runtime Gateway: DROS VajraClaw)          โ”‚  <โ”€โ”€ ๐Ÿ›๏ธ ้‡‘ๅบซๅฎˆ่ก› (Execution Identity)
โ”‚    - W3C DID ่บซๅˆ†ๆŒ‡็ด‹ + 364ns ๆฌŠ้™้ปž้™ฃๆŸฅ่กจ                  โ”‚      ๆŒ‡ๅฎšๅŸบๆบ–ๆธฌ่ฉฆ้…็ฝฎไธ‹ๅŸท่กŒ่ทฏๅพ‘ๅปถ้ฒ <1 ฮผs๏ผ
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ฌโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
                               โ”‚ (ๆ”พ่กŒๅˆๆณ•็š„ Syscall / Egress ๆต้‡)
                               โ–ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ 3. ๅŸบ็คŽ่จญๆ–ฝ่ˆ‡ๆ ธๅฟƒๅฑค (Infra SecOps: OpenShip / Falco / Cilium)โ”‚  <โ”€โ”€ ๐Ÿš“ ็‰น่ญฆ้˜ฒ็ทš (Kernel & Network Fabric)
โ”‚    - Cilium ๅฐ้Ž–ๆƒกๆ„ๅค–็™ผ๏ผ›Falco eBPF ๆ ธๅฟƒๅฑคๆ•ๆ‰ๅฎนๅ™จ้€ƒ้€ธ     โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜

๐Ÿงญ ๆฒป็†้‚Š็•Œ๏ผšDROS ๅฎˆ่ญทไป€้บผ vs. ไธๅฎˆ่ญทไป€้บผ

็‚บไบ†็ถญ่ญทๆฅต่‡ดๅšด่ฌน็š„ๅทฅ็จ‹็•Œ็ทš่ˆ‡้˜ฒ็ฆฆ็ฏ„็–‡๏ผŒDROS ๆ˜Ž็ขบๅŠƒๅฎš้‚Š็•Œ๏ผš

ๆ”ปๆ“Šๆ‰‹ๆณ•่ˆ‡ๅจ่„…ๆƒ…ๅขƒ ๅ‚ณ็ตฑ่ชžๆ„ Guardrails DROS VajraClaw ็‰ฉ็†ๅพฎๆ ธๅฟƒ ๆœ€็ต‚้˜ฒ็ฆฆๆ•ˆๆžœ
้–“ๆŽฅๆ็คบ่ฉžๆณจๅ…ฅ (็ถฒ้ /PDF ๅคพๅธถๆŒ‡ไปค่ฉ้จ™ Agent ๅˆชๅบซ) โŒ LLM ่ชžๆ„ๆททๆท†ๆ˜“่ขซ็นž้Ž โœ… ็ขบๅฎšๆ€งๆ””ๆˆช ็ขบๅฎšๆ€งๅธถๅ…ง็‰ฉ็†็†”ๆ–ท (<1ฮผs ๅŸบๆบ–ๆธฌ่ฉฆ้ปž้™ฃๆŸฅ่กจ)
ๅดๅ‘่ถŠๆฌŠ่ชฟ็”จ (ๆœชๆŽˆๆฌŠๅค–ๆŽ›ๅทๅทๅ‘ผๅซ DB/ไป˜ๆฌพ Tool) โŒ ๆ‡‰็”จๅฑค้‚่ผฏ่„†ๅผฑ โœ… ๅฏ†็ขผๅญธ้˜ปๆ–ท 100% ้˜ปๆ–ท (ๅœจๅฎš็พฉไน‹ๅจ่„…ๆจกๅž‹่ˆ‡ Capability ๅ‘้‡ๅ…ง)
็ง่‡ชๅค–็™ผๆดฉๅฏ† (ๅค–ๆŽ›็ง่‡ช้€ฃ็ทšๅค–้ƒจ C2 ๅ‚ณ่ผธๆฉŸๅฏ†) โŒ LLM ๅฎŒๅ…จ็„กๆ„Ÿ โœ… ็ถฒ่ทฏๅพฎ้š”้›ข 100% ไธŸๅŒ… (internal: true ๆฒ™็›’ๆ‹“ๆ’ฒ)
ๅฎนๅ™จ้€ƒ้€ธ่ˆ‡ๅฎฟไธปๆฉŸๆๆฌŠ โŒ ็„กไธปๆฉŸๆ ธๅฟƒ่ฆ–่ง’ โš ๏ธ ๅ”ๅŒ Falco eBPF ๆ ธๅฟƒๅฑคๆ•ๆ‰ (cap_drop: ALL ็‰นๆฌŠๅ‰ๅฅช้š”้›ข)
ๆฅญๅ‹™้‚่ผฏ้Œฏ่ชค่ˆ‡ๆจกๅž‹ๅนป่ฆบ โŒ ่ถ…ๅ‡บ่ณ‡ๅฎ‰็ฏ„็–‡ โŒ ่ถ…ๅ‡บ่ณ‡ๅฎ‰็ฏ„็–‡ ๅฑฌ LLM ็”Ÿๆˆๅ“่ณช๏ผŒ็”ฑ Prompt ๅทฅ็จ‹่ˆ‡ QA ๆต็จ‹ๅ„ชๅŒ–

๐Ÿ”‘ ้›ถไฟกไปป้‡‘้‘ฐ่ˆ‡ Root ๆ•‘ๆด็”Ÿๆญป่ญฆ็คบ

DROS ๅšดๆ ผ่ฒซๅพน ้›ถไฟกไปปๅฏ†็ขผๅญธๆžถๆง‹๏ผš

  1. ๅŽŸๅป ็„กๅพŒ้–€่ฒๆ˜Ž (No Backdoors)๏ผšๅŽŸๅป ็„กไปปไฝ•่ฌ็”จ้‡‘้‘ฐใ€‚ๆ‚จ็š„ Ed25519 ็ง้‘ฐ็จฎๅญ (Seed Hex) ๅƒ…ๅญ˜ๅœจๆœฌๅœฐ่จ˜ๆ†ถ้ซ”๏ผŒ่ซ‹ๅ‹™ๅฟ…่‡ช่กŒๅฆฅๅ–„ๅ‚™ไปฝ่‡ณๅฏ†็ขผๅบซ (1Password / Bitwarden)ใ€‚
  2. ้‡ๅปบไฟกไปปๆ น (Rebuilding Root of Trust)๏ผš่‹ฅ้บๅคฑ็ง้‘ฐ๏ผŒๅ”ฏๆœ‰ๅœจไฟๆœ‰ไผบๆœๅ™จๆœ€้ซ˜ Root / SSH ็ฎก็†ๅ“กๆฌŠ้™ ็š„ๅ‰ๆไธ‹๏ผŒๆ–นๅฏๆ‰‹ๅ‹•ๆ›ฟๆ›้ฉ—่ญ‰ๅ…ฌ้‘ฐไปฅ้‡ๅปบไฟกไปปๆ นใ€‚

๐ŸŒ ้€š็”จๅคš Agent ๆททๅˆๅทฅไฝœ็ซ™ๆ‹“ๆ’ฒ (DSH + AGY + Codex + Claude)

DROS ้›–ไปฅ DSH ๅค–ๆŽ›ๅฝขๅผๆไพ›ไธ€้ตๅฎ‰่ฃ๏ผŒไฝ†ๅบ•ๅฑคๆ˜ฏ ๆจ™ๆบ–ๅŒ– Docker ๅฎนๅ™จ (localhost:8080)๏ผŒๅ–ฎๅฐ้–‹็™ผๆฉŸๅฏๅŒๆ™‚ๅฎˆ่ญทๅคšๅ€‹ไธๅŒๅนณๅฐ็š„ๆดป่บ Agent๏ผˆๅ…ฑ็”จ 5 ๅ€‹ไธฆ็™ผ้…้ก๏ผ‰๏ผš

  • DSH ไฝฟ็”จ่€… โž” ้€้Ž dsh-plugin-vajraclaw ๆŽฅๅ…ฅใ€‚
  • Google Antigravity (AGY) โž” ้€้Ž MCP ็ถฒ้—œๆˆ– Python SDK ๆŽฅๅ…ฅใ€‚
  • OpenAI Codex / Claude Code / Cursor โž” ้€้Žๆœฌๅœฐ REST API / Hook ๆ””ๆˆชๆŽฅๅ…ฅใ€‚

๐Ÿ’ก ๆœ€ๆ–ฐๅฎšๅƒน่ˆ‡ๆ–นๆกˆ่ซ‹ไปฅ ๅฎ˜ๆ–น็ถฒ็ซ™ (dr-os.io) ๅ…ฌๅธƒ็‚บๆบ–ใ€‚

ๅฎ‰ๅ…จๅŠŸ่ƒฝ / 6-Pillar ๆฉŸๅˆถ็ถญๅบฆ ๐ŸŸข Hacker / ๅ€‹ไบบ็คพ็พค็‰ˆ (ๅ…่ฒป) ๐Ÿ”ต Startup ๐ŸŸฃ Enterprise ๐Ÿ‘‘ Sovereign
็›ฎๆจ™ๅฎขๆˆถ ๅ€‹ไบบ้–‹็™ผ่€… / ๆœฌๆฉŸๅคš Agent ็Žฉๅฎถ 10~50ไบบๆ–ฐๅ‰ตๅœ˜้šŠ ไธญๅคงๅž‹ไผๆฅญ / ไธŠๅธ‚ๅ…ฌๅธ ้‡‘่ž้‡‘ๆŽง / ๅœ‹้˜ฒ
ๆฉŸๅ™จๆŽˆๆฌŠ (UUIDs) 1 ็ต„ UUID 3 ็ต„ UUIDs 15 ็ต„ UUIDs ็„ก้™ๅˆถ
Concurrent Agents ไธŠ้™ 5 ๅ€‹ไธฆ็™ผ Agent 30 ๅ€‹ 450 ๅ€‹ ็„ก้™ๅˆถ (Swarm)
Pillar 1๏ผšPrincipal ่บซไปฝ่ญ‰ๆ˜Ž โœ… ๅŽŸ็”Ÿ W3C did:key ๆŒ‡็ด‹ โœ… 3-Tier PKI DIT โœ… ่ทจๅŸŸ BEC ๆ†‘่ญ‰็™ผๆ”พ โœ… ็กฌ้ซ” Dongle ๅฐ่จ˜
Pillar 2๏ผšAuthorization ๆฌŠ้™ๅ€้š” โœ… AST ้ปž้™ฃๅœ–ๆฏ”ๅฐ โœ… ้›ถๅ †็ฉ Bitmaps โœ… ๅ…จ่‡ช่จ‚ Capability ๅ‘้‡ โœ… ๅ‹•ๆ…‹ไฝๅ…ƒๅœ–ๅคš็ถญ็Ÿฉ้™ฃ
Pillar 3๏ผšTool Bound ๅทฅๅ…ท้‚Š็•Œ โœ… C-ABI / HTTP ็†”ๆ–ท (<1ฮผs) โœ… 26.1ฮผs ๅธถๅ…ง็†”ๆ–ท โœ… Sub-500ns Thread Panic โœ… ๆ™ถ็‰‡็กฌ้ซ”็ดš็‰ฉ็†็†”ๆ–ท
Pillar 4๏ผšPolicy Gate ไธ‰ๅคง้–€้–ฅ โŒ ๅƒ…้œๆ…‹่ฆๅ‰‡ โœ… ๅ‹•ๆ…‹ PII ้ฎ่”ฝ โœ… HITL ้›™็ฐฝ + ZKP-Lite โœ… ่ป่ฆ็ดš้–€้–ฅ็Ÿฉ้™ฃ
Pillar 5๏ผšAudit Log ็จฝๆ ธ่ฟฝๆบฏ โœ… Ed25519 ็ฐฝ็ซ ๆ—ฅ่ชŒ โœ… Ed25519 ๆ•ธไฝ็ฐฝ็ซ  โœ… SHA-256 Merkle ้›œๆนŠ้ˆ โœ… ไธๅฏๅฆ่ชๆ€งๆณ•้™ข็ดšๆ†‘่ญ‰
Pillar 6๏ผšExpiry/Revocation ็ง’ๆ’ค โŒ ้œ€้‡ๅ•Ÿ Gateway ๐ŸŸก 15ๅˆ†้˜ BEC ้ŽๆœŸ โœ… <1ฮผs RCU ๅŽŸๅญๆŒ‡้‡ๅˆ‡ๆ› โœ… ๅˆ†ๆ•ฃๅผ็ง’็ดš็ถฒๆ ผๆ’ค้Šท
RFC-010 ้–‹ๆ”พ Agent ่ญท็…งๆ ผๅผ โœ… ๆœฌๅœฐๅฎŒๆ•ด็ฐฝ็ซ ็™ผ่กŒ โœ… ๅคš่ง’่‰ฒ DIT ็ฐฝ็ฝฒ โœ… ไผๆฅญ GuardVM ้›†ไธญ้ฉ—่ญ‰ โœ… ๅœ‹้˜ฒ็ดš 3-Tier ็ฐฝ็ซ ้ˆ
้–‹ๆ”พๅฝˆๆ€งๅŠ ่ณผ็”ขๆฅญๅˆ่ฆ Package โŒ ไธ้–‹ๆ”พๅŠ ่ณผ ๐Ÿ’ก ้–‹ๆ”พๅฝˆๆ€งๅŠ ่ณผ โญ ้–‹ๆ”พๅฝˆๆ€งๅŠ ่ณผ โœ… ๅŒ…ๅซๅฎŒๆ•ดๆฌŠ้™
้ƒจ็ฝฒ่ผ‰้ซ” Local PC / ๅคš Agent Docker ็ถฒ้—œ VM / NAS Docker K8s / GKE / Cluster Air-Gapped / FPGA

๐Ÿš€ 30 ็ง’ๆฅต้€ŸไธŠๆ‰‹

ๆญฅ้ฉŸ 1๏ผšๅ•Ÿๅ‹• DROS Docker ็ถฒ้—œ

docker run -d -p 8080:8080 --name dros-gateway dros/hacker-gateway:v1.0.0

ๆญฅ้ฉŸ 2๏ผš้€ฃๆŽฅๆ‚จ็š„ Agent

  • DSH ไฝฟ็”จ่€…๏ผšๅฎ‰่ฃๅค–ๆŽ›ๅณๅฏ่‡ชๅ‹•้€ฃ็ทš๏ผš
    dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-plugin-vajraclaw
    
  • AGY / Codex / Claude Code / Cursor / Python SDK ไฝฟ็”จ่€…๏ผš ๅƒ…้œ€้…็ฝฎๅ…ฉ่กŒ็’ฐๅขƒ่ฎŠๆ•ธ๏ผŒๅณๅฏ็ซ‹ๅณๅฐ‡ๆœฌๆฉŸ Agent ็ดๅ…ฅ DROS ๅพฎ็ง’็ดšๅŸท่กŒๆฒป็†่ˆ‡ W3C DID ๅญ˜่ญ‰้‚Š็•Œ๏ผš
    export DROS_GATEWAY_URL="http://localhost:8080"
    export DROS_IDENTITY_SEED="0x1a2b3c4d..." # ๆœฌๆฉŸๅฐˆๅฑฌ Ed25519 ็ง้‘ฐ็จฎๅญ Hex
    

๐Ÿ‘‰ ๐Ÿ“– ้–ฑ่ฎ€้€ฒ้šŽ่ณ‡ๅฎ‰่ˆ‡ๅคš Agent ๆ‹“ๆ’ฒๅŠ ๅ›บๆ‰‹ๅ†Š (docs/ADVANCED_SECOPS_GUIDE.md)๏ผˆ็ฒๅ– internal: true ็ถฒ่ทฏๅพฎ้š”้›ข Compose ็ฏ„ๆœฌใ€Falco eBPF ๆ ธๅฟƒ้˜ฒ้€ƒ้€ธ่ˆ‡ Wazuh SIEM ๆ•ดๅˆๆŒ‡ๅ—๏ผ‰ใ€‚


๐Ÿ“œ ็›ธ้—œๆŠ€่ก“ๆ ธๅฟƒ่ซ–ๆ–‡่ˆ‡ๅฏฆๆธฌ้ฉ—่ญ‰ (Technical Foundations & Benchmarks)

ๆœฌๅฐˆๆกˆไน‹็ขบๅฎšๆ€งๅŸท่กŒๆฒป็†ใ€ๅพฎ็ง’็ดš็†”ๆ–ท่ˆ‡ๅฏ†็ขผๅญธๅญ˜่ญ‰ๆฉŸๅˆถ๏ผŒๅƒ่€ƒไธฆๅปถไผธ่‡ชไปฅไธ‹ๆ ธๅฟƒๆŠ€่ก“่ซ–ๆ–‡่ˆ‡้–‹ๆบๅฏฆๆธฌ็’ฐๅขƒ๏ผš

  1. ๆ ธๅฟƒๆžถๆง‹่ˆ‡ๅ…ญๅคงไฟกไปป้‚Š็•Œ (Core Architecture):

  2. ๅ››ๅฑคๆทฑๅบฆ้˜ฒ็ฆฆๆžถๆง‹ (Defense-in-Depth Model):

  3. ๅค–ๆŽ› FFI ่ˆ‡ไธๅฏๅฆ่ชๅญ˜่ญ‰ๆจก็ต„ (Runtime Attribution Framework):

    • Runtime Attribution Framework: An External C-ABI and PKI-Based Zero-Trust Infrastructure for Non-Repudiable Execution Governance in Multi-Agent Systems
    • Zenodo DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21903687 | ่จ˜้Œ„ๅ…ธ่—: zenodo.org/records/21903687
  4. ้–‹ๆบๆŠ€่ก“ๆจ™ๆบ–่ˆ‡ๅฏฆๆธฌๅŸบๆบ–ๅ€‰ (Open Standard & Verification Sandbox):

    • RFC-010 ่ฆ็ฏ„: ้ตๅพช้–‹ๆ”พ Agent ่บซๅˆ†่ˆ‡ๅญ˜่ญ‰่ฆ็ฏ„๏ผˆW3C DID did:key ่ˆ‡ Ed25519 ็ฐฝ็ซ ้ˆ๏ผ‰ใ€‚
    • ๅฏฆๆธฌๅŸบๆบ–็’ฐๅขƒ: DROS-VEP Lite (ๅฏๅพฉ็พๅฎ‰ๅ…จ่ฉ•ๆธฌๆฒ™็›’)
    • ๅฏฆๆธฌๅ ฑๅ‘Š: ๆถต่“‹ 24 ๅฐๆ™‚้•ทๆ•ˆๅคšๅ ดๆ™ฏๆธฌ่ฉฆๆ•ธๆ“š๏ผˆ160,611 ๆฌก่ซ‹ๆฑ‚้ฉ—่ญ‰๏ผŒๆฑบ็ญ–ๅปถ้ฒ 26.1ฮผs๏ผ‰ใ€‚

๐Ÿ›๏ธ ๅฎ˜ๆ–น็™ผ่กŒ็ต„็น”่ˆ‡่ฏ็นซ่ณ‡่จŠ (Official Contact)


๐Ÿ“„ ๅฐˆๅˆฉ่ˆ‡ๆณ•ๅพ‹่ฒๆ˜Ž

ๅฐˆๅˆฉ่ฒๆ˜Ž๏ผš DROS ๅŸท่กŒๆฒป็†่ˆ‡ๅฎ‰ๅ…จๆŠ€่ก“ๅทฒ็”ณ่ซ‹็พŽๅœ‹่‡จๆ™‚ๅฐˆๅˆฉไฟ่ญท๏ผˆU.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 64/111,973๏ผŒPatent Pending๏ผ‰ใ€‚